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Mandating the Supersize Option: The
Legality of Government Intervention in the
Fast Food Industry to Address Insufficient
Wages and Close the Public Assistance Gap
Joshua A. Berman *
Several prominent studies have recently highlighted how the
federal government tacitly subsidizes insufficient wages paid in
certain industries–notably, major corporations within the fastfood sector. Historically, the government addressed insufficient
wages by implementing a minimum standard-of-living wage.
Since the New Deal inception of this remedy, the Judiciary has
regularly upheld the minimum wage in the face of challenges to
its constitutionality. Given the recent passage of a substantial
increase in the minimum wage and the toxic political cloud
hovering over the United States Congress, President Obama
likely will have a difficult time in passing another increase, as he
has promised since his first campaign. Even if passed, the
constitutionality of such a hike will likely face a more rigorous
test by a conservative Supreme Court that features five Justices
appointed by Republican Presidents. This Comment seeks to
understand the kind of test that the Court might use, and to
analyze the constitutionality of a wage increase through the lens
of potential tests.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Liam, an unmarried 29-year-old employee at
McDonald’s, earns the minimum wage while working a traditional fortyhour week. The $15,080 annual pay 1 he receives would represent a figure
roughly twenty-six percent higher than the federally established poverty
threshold, 2 which is a dollar amount that somewhat reflect a family’s
1

The total, $15,080, is borne by calculating $7.25 per hour times forty hours per week
times fifty-two weeks per year. This figure reflects the full enactment of the Fair
Minimum Wage Act of 2007, a supplemental appropriations bill that raised the minimum
wage established by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 from $5.25 per hour. Fair
Minimum Wage Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2007).
2
The poverty threshold in 2012 was $11,945 for a one-person household. The
calculation is wages earned less poverty line, quantity divided by the poverty line.
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 51 (Sept. 2013). The U.S.
government measures poverty with two different standards, poverty thresholds and
poverty guidelines. Poverty thresholds were first published by the Social Security
Administration in January 1965 and are updated annually by the Census Bureau for
statistical purposes. Poverty guidelines are issued annually by the Department of Health
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most basic needs to determine poverty status.3 Liam, cast in a different
light, would be counted among the three-quarters of Americans who live
paycheck-to-paycheck. 4 Modify the hypothetical such that Liam is
instead the sole earner for a family of four, and Liam’s income is only
sixty-five percent of the federal poverty guideline. 5
Liam’s choice of theoretical plights represents the unfortunate
realities facing many Americans today. In the United States, more than
forty-five million individuals live below the poverty line, 6 and “[f]ewer
than one in four Americans have enough money in their savings account
to cover at least six months of expenses, enough to help cushion the blow
of a job loss, medical emergency or some other unexpected event.” 7
The federal government provides a buffer by way of welfare for most
of these individuals against their falling into abject poverty. In 2012, the
federal government was projected to combat poverty by spending $668
billion on at least 126 different programs, 8 including food stamps and
Medicaid. 9 State and local governments were projected to supplement
federal welfare spending with an additional $284 billion, totaling
government spending at all levels at roughly $952 billion. 10 As of Labor
Day 2013, “welfare currently pays more than a minimum-wage job in 35

and Human Services in the Federal Register and are used for administrative purposes.
Report from Gordon M. Fisher, United States Census Bureau, titled The Development of
the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds and Their Subsequent History as the U.S. Poverty
Measure (last revised September 1997) (on file with the United States Census Bureau,
202-690-6143). This Comment will take both definitions into account, but will mostly
rely on poverty guidelines in its discussion of welfare benefits.
3
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/about/overview/measure.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2014); see also Danielle Kurtzleben, 50 Years Later, a War Over the Poverty
Rate, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/01
/06/50-years-later-a-war-over-the-poverty-rate.
4
Angela Johnson, 76% of Americans Are Living Paycheck-to-Paycheck, CNN (June
24, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/24/pf/emergency-savings/ (citing
BANKRATE, June 2013 Financial Security Index Charts, http://www.bankrate.com/finance
/consumer-index/financial-security-charts-0613.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
5
CTR. FOR POVERTY RESEARCH, What Are the Annual Earnings for a Full-Time
Minimum Wage Earner?, U.C. DAVIS, http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-are-annualearnings-full-time-minimum-wage-worker (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
6
DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 2, at 12.
7
Johnson, supra note 4.
8
Michael Tanner, The American Welfare State: How We Spend Nearly $1 Trillion a
Year Fighting Poverty—And Fail, CATO INST., Policy Analysis No. 694, 2012, at 1.
9
Id. at 2-3.
10
Id. at 1.
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states, even after accounting for the Earned Income Tax Credit,”11
“which offers extra subsidies to low-income workers who take work.” 12
Those who do take minimum wage jobs often find themselves
scrambling to make ends meet to pay for their homes, meals, healthcare,
and other basic expenses. 13 Many times, minimum wage earners generate
bills that must be paid, in part, by means-tested government welfare
programs. 14 Twenty-five percent of the workforce as a whole, which
includes workers in nearly every sector of the economy, 15 receives public
assistance. 16
No industry had a greater share of workers enrolled in public
programs than the fast food industry, which counted fifty-two percent of
its workers as welfare recipients. 17 The biggest culprit of the industry:
McDonald’s, whose employees are estimated to receive $1.2 billion
annually from the government. 18 According to a data brief issued by the
National Employment Law Project, “low wages and lack of benefits at
the [ten] largest fast-food companies 19 in the United States cost taxpayers
an estimated $3.8 billion each year.” 20 Meanwhile, the seven
corporations of these ten that are publically traded combined for a profit
of $7.44 billion and distributed $7.7 billion in shareholder benefits.21
11

MICHAEL TANNER & CHARLES HUGHES, THE WORK VERSUS WELFARE TRADE-OFF:
2013, CATO INST., 1 (2013).
12
Avik Roy, On Labor Day 2013, Welfare Pays More Than Minimum-Wage Work in
(Sept.
2,
2013,
11:50
AM),
35
States,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/09/02/on-labor-day-2013-welfare-paysmore-than-minimum-wage-work-in-35-states/.
13
See generally Alan Feuer, Life on $7.25 an Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at
MB.1.
14
See generally Tanner, supra note 8.
15
SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., FAST FOOD, POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF
LOW-WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY 7 (October 15, 2013). The report includes
calculations of workers enrolled in public programs who are employed in the following
industries: restaurant and food services; agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; other services;
other leisure and hospitality; retail trade; construction; health and social services;
transportation and utilities; manufacturing; professional and business services; wholesale
trade; mining; educational services; information; financial activities; and public
administration.
16
Id. at 1.
17
Id.
18
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, SUPER-SIZING PUBLIC COSTS: HOW LOW WAGES AT TOP
FAST-FOOD CHAINS LEAVE TAXPAYERS FOOTING THE BILL 2 (October 2013) (citing
ALLEGRETTO, supra note 15).
19
The ten largest fast-food companies ranked by size of U.S.-based restaurant
workforce are McDonald’s, Yum Brands (which includes Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and
KFC), Subway, Burger King, Wendy’s, Dunkin’ Donuts, Dairy Queen, Little Caesars,
Sonic, and Domino’s. Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 3.
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Liam is, both in his imaginary bachelorhood and in his theoretical
family life, a strong representation of the majority of fast-food workers in
the modern era. The fast food industry, once dominated by acne-pocked
teenagers, is now populated by workers with an average age of 29, many
of whom attempted college and more than a quarter of whom are parents
raising children. 22 Many fast-food workers must work multiple jobs to
make ends meet for their families. 23 The president of the International
Franchise Association asserted that the fast-food industry’s wages, like
all minimum wages, were “never meant to be a living wage,” 24 and our
imaginary friend Liam would most certainly agree. With traditionally
limited occupational mobility and low median wages, the fast food
industry’s likelihood of identifying and correcting the public assistance
gap is small. 25
This Comment contends that the duty to protect an individual’s basic
standard of living and prudently invest taxpayers’ dollars falls squarely
on the shoulders of the federal government. Recent data strongly
indicates that many companies—specifically those in the fast-food
industry—are functionally using federal money as a subsidy to
supplement workers’ insufficient wages. Such a knowing reliance on
taxpayers to augment industry wages is, at a minimum, questionable
behavior. This Comment argues that such behavior constitutes a negative
externality tacitly–and wrongfully–paid by a Congress that turns a blind
eye towards the practice. Accordingly, Congress ought to pass new
legislation that adjusts the industry’s minimum-wage floor upwards to
better reflect a calibrated poverty threshold and account for business
externalities in the form of public assistance to minimum-wage earners.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I revisits the original legal
justifications for a minimum wage and updates those rationales to apply
to the modern-day workforce. Part II examines the efficacy of the current
minimum wage in light of both the poverty threshold and poverty
guidelines, with particular attention given to the fast-food industry. Part
III analyzes the possible legal implications of a company’s cognizant
reliance on taxpayers to bridge the gap between earned wages and the
basic threshold for living expenses. Part IV discusses possible remedies.
Part V concludes by arguing that the federal government has a duty to
regulate the cost of the public assistance gap so as to more prudently
appropriate taxpayer dollars.

22

Feuer, supra note 13, at MB.1.
See generally id.
24
Feuer, supra note 13, at MB.1.
25
See generally NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, GOING NOWHERE FAST: LIMITED
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY (2013).
23
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JUSTIFYING THE MINIMUM WAGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

The federal minimum wage was signed into law during the New
Deal Era as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Legend has it
that “when he felt the time was ripe, [President Roosevelt] asked
[Secretary of Labor] Perkins, ‘[w]hat happened to that nice
unconstitutional bill you had tucked away?’” 26 The Act set the minimum
hourly wage at twenty-five cents, in addition to banning oppressive child
labor and capping the workweek at forty-four hours. 27
American economists touted the idea of establishing a minimum
wage since the early 1900s, 28 while other nations 29 implemented similar
standards of compulsory arbitration.30 The minimum wage was floated as
a means to help the factory system better compete “in its struggle against
small workshops and home work.” 31 However, given that Americans
generally assumed that such a measure would prove unconstitutional as a
violation of the freedom of contract, economists did not fully engage in
discourse revolving the economic validity of a minimum wage. 32

A.
Legal Theories for Establishing a Federal Minimum Wage
Policy
One of the early legal theories was that “[t]here is no constitutional
objection to the limitation of the freedom of contract, provided that the
limitation is not accomplished without due process of law.”33 The theory,
advanced by A.N. Holcombe, is predicated on the notion that the
26

Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, 24.
27
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938); see also Victor M. Valarde, On
the Construction of Section 203(O) of the FLSA: Exclusion Without Exemption, 21 U.
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 253, 255 (2013) (“Congress enacted the FLSA in a period of
widespread unemployment in order to eliminate labor conditions that were ‘detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living . . . without substantially curtailing
employment.”).
28
See generally H.B. Lees Smith, Economic Theory and Proposals for a Legal
Minimum Wage, 17 ECON. J. 504, (1907); A.N. Holcombe, The Legal Minimum Wage in
the United States, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 21, (1912).
29
Holcombe, supra note 28, at 21.
30
Smith, supra note 28, at 508 (“When every industry in which wages are below a
certain minimum is brought within operation of a wages board . . . the minimum wage
gradually becomes university. Similarly, a system of compulsory arbitration . . . has the
same effect, if the workers in the ill-paid trade appeal for arbitration, and the court in
each case fixes the lowest wages at a certain minimum.”).
31
Id. at 512.
32
See generally Holcombe, supra note 28, at 21.
33
Id. at 27.

2014]

MANDATING THE SUPERSIZE OPTION

183

limitation must be justified by the “social necessity for the maintenance
of the family” 34 and presupposes that the oppressive employment of
women and minors threatens that family structure.35 Holcombe asserts
that the limitation may be accomplished through the exercise of the
ordinary police power, under which the federal government has the
ability to regulate interstate commerce. 36
Having established that a limitation to the freedom of contract may
be constitutional and, further, that the United States government has a
mechanism available at its disposal to enact such a control, Holcombe
continues by assessing the reasonableness of federal action. So long as
the public perception is that the federal wage is reasonable—”the
American public should be convinced that some action for the protection
of the American standard of living is necessary, and that the proposed
remedy is appropriate” 37—there ought to be no difference between the
regulation of work hours and of wages. 38
With the logical framework in place establishing the constitutionality
of the laws, Holcombe arrives at what he signals is the proper definition
for minimum standard-of-living wage laws, as defined by legislation
pending (at the time) in Wisconsin:
[To protect] the public against the evil results of
employment at less than standard-of-living wages . . .
[define] the minimum wage as such compensation for
labor performed under reasonable conditions as should
enable employees to secure for themselves and those
who are, or may be, reasonably dependent upon them,
the necessary comforts of life. 39
34

Id. at 27.
Id. at 26-27. Holcombe notes that the constitutional freedom of contract may be
exercised solely by men, which allows the “industrial exploitation” of woman and
minors. Minimum wage advocates attempted to secure legislation that would protect
those two classes of people, but Holcombe argues that as women have a familial interest
against wage exploitation, men do, too, in their joint capacity as heads of the household.
As such, Holcombe advances the theory that a minimum standard-of-living wage should
be universal in application.
36
Id. at 27. This logic would therefore hold that state regulation of wages, while not
inherently unconstitutional, might be violative of the Constitution insofar as those
regulations apply to persons whose activities are intertwined with interstate commerce.
37
Id. at 29.
38
Holcombe, supra note 28, at 29. Holcombe refers here to the Illinois Supreme
Court’s reversal of a previous decision that the regulations of hours of labor of women
was unconstitutional to show that “social reformers who can prove their case for the
minimum wage may expect equally favorable consideration from the courts.” See also
W.C. Ritchie & Co. et al. v. Wayman et al., 244 Ill. 509 (Ill. 1910).
39
Id. at 30-31.
35
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The bill, however, failed to define the phrase “the necessary comforts of
life,” which had also been used in seven40 state constitutions without
further clarification.

B.

Supreme Court Rulings on Minimum Wage Law

Holcombe’s argument for the constitutionality of a minimum wage
law appeared incorrect, however, in 1923 when the Supreme Court
nullified a District of Columbia law establishing a minimum wage for
women. 41 Had this case come before the Supreme Court a mere six years
earlier, the minimum wage ordinance would very likely have been held
constitutional.42
By 1936, the Court’s composition had yet to shift in favor of
minimum wage laws. In Morehead v. Tipaldo, 43 the Supreme Court
voted 5-4 against a New York-legislated minimum wage law that
established a minimum weekly wage for women, on the grounds that the
law violated the employer’s liberty of contract. 44 The decision was met
40
Id. at 31. Seven states used the phrase “necessary comforts of life” in their state
constitutions: Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin. The phrase was generally used “in connection with the grant to their
respective legislatures of the power to enact debtors’ exemption laws.”
41
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
42
Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 545, 546 (1924). Powell relates the story of a case originating out of Oregon on the
matter of minimum wage to demonstrate how:
The law of constitutional due process . . . upon the composition of the
court of last resort at the particular time when the issue comes before
it . . . .
The question [on the constitutionality of minimum-wage legislation]
first came before the Oregon court in 1914, and in two decisions
seven judges declared themselves in favor of the legislation and none
was opposed. The Oregon case went to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and in 1917 the decree of the state court was sustained
by a vote of four to four. Mr. Justice Brandeis, having been of
counsel, did not sit. His general outlook on what is called social
legislation is so well known that there can be no doubt that, had he
not been of counsel, he would have voted in favor of the law. In that
event, the consequent five-to-four vote almost certainly would have
established the constitutionality of such legislation against
subsequent attack in the federal courts. Though conceivably a
favorable decision might later have been overruled by a differently
composed Supreme Court, the experience is that police issues of this
general character are finally settled by such favorable decision.
Id. In the six-year period between the four-four decision in the two Oregon cases and the
five-three decision in Adkins, four changes in the Supreme Court would take place. Id. at
547.
43
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
44
Id. at 611.
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with widespread hostility and labor standards became a central tenet of
President Roosevelt’s re-election campaign. 45 It was during this time that
President Roosevelt famously advocated his court-packing scheme. 46
Roosevelt’s blustering realized its intended impact when Justice
Owen Roberts sided with the Court’s liberal contingency to uphold
minimum wage legislation47 in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish. 48
This decision empowered liberals to push for labor legislation that
offered further protection for workers. 49 In 1938, that work was realized
in the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 50 The FLSA was
ruled constitutional as a matter of interstate commerce in U.S. v. Darby
Lumber Company, and with it, the federal minimum wage was upheld.51

C.

The Economic Components of the Minimum Wage Debate

By the end of World War II, the public was declaring that the
“minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
have been repealed by inflation” and was advocating a higher wage
floor. 52 Dr. George Stigler, the 1982 Nobel Prize for Economics recipient
and long-time University of Chicago Economics professor, 53 countered
the public’s opinion and contended that minimum wage legislation did
not diminish poverty. 54 Stigler argued that “unless the minimum wage
varies with the amount of employment [in a family], number of earners,
non-wage income, family size, and many other factors, it will be an inept
device for combatting poverty even for those who succeed in retaining
employment.” 55 Other economists have corroborated Stigler’s theoretical
point that “the link between low wages and low family incomes is
imperfect.” 56
In contrast, Dr. Arin Dube, Associate Professor of Economics at the
University of Massachusetts–Amherst, finds in a recent empirical study
that “[t]he totality of evidence from the 12 published studies for which I
45

Grossman, supra note 26, at 23.
Id. at 23.
47
Id. at 23-24.
48
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49
Grossman, supra note 26, at 24.
50
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1938).
51
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
52
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON.
REV. 358, 358 (1946).
53
George J. Stigler, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON., available at http://www.
econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Stigler.html.
54
Stigler, supra note 53, at 358.
55
Id. at 363.
56
Arindrajit Dube, Minimum Wages and the Distribution of Family Incomes 32 (Dec.
30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
46

186

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:177

could obtain or construct minimum wage elasticities point towards some
poverty reduction from minimum wage increases.” 57 Dube acknowledges
Stigler’s findings that there is not a $1-to-$1 relationship of dollars the
minimum wage is raised to dollars less in poverty a family finds itself,
but he argues that raising the minimum wage is a big part of the
equation. 58 If the minimum wage were to increase from $7.25 per hour to
$10.10 per hour, 59 families with an income in the bottom ten percent of
America would realize an increased income of about twelve percent,
which is the annual equivalent of roughly $1,700. 60
Stigler and Dube are not, however, in contradiction as they might
appear facially. Stigler analyzes the minimum wage efficacy in a
theoretical vacuum with (relative to today) little available data,
concluding that the minimum wage is not an effective means to fight
poverty; Dube incorporated twelve other studies on minimum wage into
his own, including some that initially concluded against minimum wage,
and he found that the minimum wage plays an important role in poverty
reduction. Dube agrees with Stigler, however, in that he states “the
minimum wage is a blunt tool when it comes to fighting poverty” 61 and
prefers “more targeted policies like cash transfers, food stamps, and
programs that raise the employment rate for highly disadvantaged
groups.” 62

D.
Day

Applying the Legal Theory of Minimum Wages to Present-

Dube echoes past studies that advance justifications for establishing
minimum wages that go beyond poverty reduction. 63 While it is clear that
alternate reasons for minimum wage policy—raising the earnings of low
and moderate earning families,64 concerns for fairness of wages, 65 and

57

Dube, supra note 56, at 30.
Id. at 33-34.
59
Dube’s analysis stems from a legislative proposal in the 113th Congress to raise the
minimum wage to $10.10 per hour. Minimum Wage Fairness Act, S. 1737, 113th
Congress (2013).
60
Id. at 34.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Dube, supra note 56, at 34 (suggesting that “concerns of fairness [should] seek to
limit the extent of wage inequality”) (citing David A. Green & Kathryn Harrison,
Minimum Wage Setting and Standards of Fairness (Inst. for Fiscal Stud., Working Paper
W10/09, 2010)).
58
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interest in curtailing an employer’s market power 66—do exist, the
overarching rationale for such laws is to combat poverty. 67 While the
Supreme Court has allowed for the introduction of minimum wage laws,
several opponents of a hike argue that such a policy shift would
demonstrate an unconstitutional overabundance of government
intervention. 68
Should the Supreme Court rely on historical precedent, however, to
determine the constitutionality of a second modern era 69 increase in the
minimum wage, it will look to social sciences data to determine whether
government intervention would be justified.70 The question of
justification will turn on the basis of whether the government has an
appropriate regulatory concern, and not on whether the financial hardship
imposed on minimum wage earners provides recourse under the law.71
In the period since Darby Lumber was decided, which entrenched
minimum standard-of-living wage policy as constitutional, the federal
66
Id. at 34 (citing Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-party Punishment and Social
Norms, 25 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAV. 63 (2004); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness
as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. R. 728
(1986)).
67
Stigler, supra note 53, at 358.
68
See generally Jeff Scully, Repeal Minimum Wage Laws, Restore Employment,
FREEDOMWORKS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/jbscully/repealminimum-wage-laws-restore-employment (“Government intervention includes . . .
simply setting minimum wages for hourly wage earners. All of these policies do the exact
opposite of what they are intended to do.”); Jonathan Karl, Alaska’s Joe Miller Wants to
Abolish Federal Minimum Wage, ABC NEWS, Oct. 4, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/alaskas-joe-miller-abolish-federal-minimum-wage/story?id=11790828&page=1
(“There should not be [a federally-established minimum wage],” Miller answered. “That
is not within the scope of the powers that are given to the federal government.”); Stephen
Dinan, Raese Won’t Hide Conservative Views, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/13/raese-wont-hide-conservativeviews/?page=all (“Mr. Raese . . . has taken fire for saying he would abolish the minimum
wage. But he has refused to back down, saying it’s not only bad policy, but it’s not
constitutional. ‘I don’t think it is. And the reason I don’t think it is, is the same reason the
[National Recovery Administration] was not constitutional in 1936,’ [Raese] said. ‘It was
declared unconstitutional because it was government micromanaging an intervention into
the private sector. Well, what are price controls, or what are wage controls? They’re the
same thing.’”)
69
Note that the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 already increased the minimum
wage from $5.25 an hour in 2006 to $5.85 an hour in 2007, $6.55 an hour in 2008, and
finally, $7.25 an hour in 2009. Fair Minimum Wage Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006).
70
See generally ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA JAMES SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1997) (describing the Supreme Court’s use
of social science research in its decision-making capacity).
71
See Maybrick v. SSA, No. 2:13-CV-508, 2013 WL 6571819 at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 13,
2013) (District Court found that a plaintiff did not plead the “deprivation of a federal
right” in alleging that “the income he receives is inadequate because it falls below the
poverty level and below what a worker could take home earning minimum wage”).
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government has established a working definition for poverty. 72 This
development is of the utmost importance: whereas the Supreme Court
approved minimum wage laws to combat gender discrimination in the
workplace 73 and affirmed use of the policy in the context of interstate
commerce, 74 today’s advocates seek to identify the minimum wage as a
tool to regulate a compelling government interest, poverty. 75 Without
poverty metrics, advocates would have a tough time of gaining Justices’
support for a data-driven policy.

III.

MEASURING THE EFFICACY OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN
PROVIDING ACCESS TO NECESSITIES

The important question, therefore is whether the data on poverty
accurately represents the plight facing many Americans today. This
Comment contends that, inherently, a minimum standard-of-living wage
ought to be sufficient for a family of three or more with a sole wage
earner to exceed any reasonably-calculated 76 poverty metric. As such, the
Comment agrees in large part with Stigler’s assessment of why fighting
poverty is a worthwhile goal:
We seek to abolish poverty in good part because it leads
to undernourishment. In this connection, dietary
appraisals show that in any income class, no matter how
low, a portion of the families secure adequate diets, and
in any income class, as high as the studies go, a portion
do not. The proportion of ill-fed, to be sure, declines
substantially as income rises, but it does not disappear.77
It is on this basis that Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security
Administration published the first poverty thresholds in 1965. 78 By
calculating
poverty thresholds for families of three or more by
taking the dollar costs of the economy food plan for
families of those sizes and multiplying the costs by a
72

See Fisher, supra note 2, at 7.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
74
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
75
See Dube, supra note 56, at 34.
76
That is to say, poverty metrics should be calculated regularly to accurately reflect
the basic needs of individuals and updated to reflect any inflationary considerations that
have arisen since those metrics were first introduced.
77
Stigler, supra note 53, at 365.
78
Fisher, supra note 2, at 6.
73
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factor of three . . . she [effectively] took a hypothetical
average family spending one third of its income on food,
and assumed that it had to cut back on its expenditures
sharply. 79
This calculation is roughly identical to that which is used to calculate
expenses for purposes of poverty determinations today.

A.
The Impact of Poverty Considerations on the Minimum
Wage
For that reason, the American poverty threshold is in dire need of a
recalibration. Whereas Americans may have spent a third of their
budgets on food in 1965, the Gates Foundation estimated that
“Americans now spend only [six] percent of their money on food.” 80 As
a result of the flawed federal poverty calculation, “[t]here’s almost a
universal acknowledgement that the number we use now doesn’t make a
whole lot of sense.” 81 According to the National Academy of Sciences,
which uses experimental measures of poverty, the poverty threshold may
be understating the issue by 1.9 percent–excluding 5.9 million
impoverished Americans from the statistics.82
Poverty guidelines, which are used for administrative purposes in
determining the financial eligibility for certain programs, are updated
from the weighted average poverty thresholds using the urban consumer
price index (CPI-U). 83 As a result, this Comment argues that many
Americans, who might otherwise qualify for certain programs of welfare
assistance, may currently be wrongfully excluded from such a
designation. Adjusting the poverty threshold to include such
impoverished Americans would remedy this issue.
The problems facing many Americans hovering around the poverty
threshold is compounded by their employment in minimum wage earning
jobs. Adjusting for inflation, the minimum wage introduced in 1938
would be worth $4.07 per hour today. 84 Four years after President
79

Id.
Kurtzleben, supra note 3 (citing BILL GATES, GATES FOUNDATION, Annual Letter
2012 (2012), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/who-we-are/resources-andmedia/annual-letters-list/annual-letter-2012).
81
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Id.
83
42 U.S.C. § 9902 (2013).
84
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data
/inflation_calculator.htm (set $ to “0.25”; then select “1938” from the first “in” dropdown menu; then select “2013” from the second “in” drop-down menu; then follow the
“Calculate” hyperlink); see also Annalyn Kurtz, A History of the Minimum Wage Since
80
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Lyndon B. Johnson declared a “War on Poverty,”85 the adjusted value of
minimum wage was $10.56 per hour. 86 Today, minimum wage is $7.25
per hour 87; “[i]n terms of purchasing power, its value is 30 percent lower
today than it was in 1968.” 88 As demonstrated through the discussion of
poverty metrics, what might have been sufficient in 1938, before the
average family’s housing and medical costs grew, is simply insufficient
today. The aforementioned reduction in the minimum wage’s buying
power has priced many families back into the dark abyss of poverty.

B.
Analyzing Whether Government Intervention is
Appropriate
The rationale behind the government intervention necessary to
establish a minimum standard-of-living wage is often steeped in poverty
considerations and fairness concerns regarding the relative strength of
many employers’ market power to exploit workers. 89 For these reasons,
studies that examine the impact of a rise in minimum wage serve this
Comment well in examining whether such a rise would lift an individual
out of poverty without proverbially ending modern capitalism.
While campaigning for the presidency in 2008, candidate Barack
Obama promised that a central tenet of his agenda would be to raise the
minimum wage to $9.50 an hour by 2011 90 and adjust it annually for
inflation. 91 Obama addressed the minimum wage again in his 2013 State
of the Union address, pushing for an incremental increase of the wage
floor to $9 an hour in 2015, and indexing the minimum wage to adjust
for inflation annually. 92 President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to
1938, CNN MONEY, Feb. 14, 2013, 10:24 AM, http://economy.money.cnn.com/2013/02
/14/minimum-wage-history/.
85
President Lyndon Baines Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964).
86
CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 84 (set $ to “1.60”; then select “1968” from the
first “in” drop-down menu; then select “2013” from the second “in” drop-down menu;
then follow the “Calculate” hyperlink); see also Kurtz, supra note 84.
87
Fair Minimum Wage Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006).
88
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, BIG BUSINESS, CORPORATE PROFITS, AND THE MINIMUM
WAGE 1 (2012).
89
See Dube, supra note 56, at 34.
90
See
Agenda–Poverty,
THE
OBAMA-BIDEN
TRANSITION
TEAM,
change.gov/agenda/poverty_agenda/ (last visited on Jan. 13, 2014); see also David G.
Taylor, Increase the Minimum Wage to $9.50 an Hour, POLIFACT, Aug. 29, 2011, 2:47
PM, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/316/increasethe-minimum-wage-to-950-an-hour/; Paul R. La Monica, Behind the Minimum Wage
Debate, CNN MONEY, Sept. 5, 2008, 11:22 AM, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/05
/markets/thebuzz/.
91
E.g., Barack Obama, Remarks at the Iowa Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines
(Nov. 10, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77021.
92
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013).
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raising the minimum wage in the 2014 iteration of the State of the Union
address by announcing “an executive order raising the minimum wage to
$10.10 an hour for future federal contract workers.” 93 Such a plan has
been met with resistance, despite arguments that “raising the minimum
wage would help boost the economy by putting more money in to the
hands of lower-income Americans, who are likely to spend it,” 94 as it
would preclude future legislatures from needing to periodically adjust the
minimum wage and effectively end debate on the policy.
Obama’s calls to action have spurred criticism. Worker advocates
contended that the annual income of a $9-minimum-wage earner would
bring home an annual pay less than the poverty level for a family of
four, 95 while employer groups point to studies projecting jobs losses
totaling roughly 467,500 jobs. 96 One Forbes contributor pointed out that
minimum wages enacted by foreign governments have most perversely
affected youth employment opportunities. 97 In New Zealand, for
example, unemployment jumped from an expected fourteen percent to
twenty percent when the special youth minimum wage–a lower
minimum wage than that imposed for adult workers–was abolished. 98
Companies are more inclined to hire and provide training for young
employees when doing so is cheaper than hiring more experienced
workers.
Other studies, still, evaluate minimum wage as an industry-specific
issue. One analysis of restaurant financials found that if the minimum
wage in the fast-food industry were raised to $15, it would drive fastfood prices twenty-five percent higher, adding $1 to the cost of a Big
93

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014).
Tami Luhby, The Impact of a $9 Minimum Wage, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:57
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/12/news/economy/obama-minimum-wage (citing
MICHAEL SALTSMAN, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF A $9.80 FEDERAL
MINIMUM WAGE 3 (2012)).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Tim Worstall, Youth Unemployment Shows the Effects of a Minimum Wage That is
Too High, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall
/2014/03/02/youth-unemployment-shows-the-effects-of-a-minimum-wage-that-is-toohigh/.
98
Id. When the special, lower minimum wage for youths was abolished in New
Zealand,
The unemployment rate for 16 and 17 year olds, which had always
tracked a fairly predictable but noisy path above the adult
unemployment rate, instead took a jump. Where we might have
expected a youth unemployment rate around 14%, it instead touched
20%. Two quarters later, when adult unemployment rates hit 4.5%,
and we would have expected youth unemployment rates around 16%,
the youth unemployment rate instead hit 27%. Id.
94
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Mac. 99 This Comment cautions against such studies, however, because of
the same fairness concerns that guide minimum wage policy in the first
instance: why should Liam, our hypothetical McDonald’s worker, earn
more for his minimum wage position than he would otherwise earn
sweeping the floors at the Pet Supermarket next door? While it is true
and demonstrated herein100 that corporations in the fast-food industry are
prone to allow their workers to rely on public assistance, such an
argument for different standards of minimum wages are considered by
this Comment to be insufficient solutions to resolving the issue at hand.
On the determination of whether government intervention is
appropriate, this Comment would be remiss, however, if it were to omit
the political obstacles that any minimum wage hikes would face. In the
first, John Boehner–whose expansive powers as Speaker of the House of
Representatives give him wide latitude over government policy–has been
quoted as saying, “I’ll commit suicide before I vote on a clean minimumwage bill.” 101 Rather than follow through on the rather morbid and surely
hyperbolic threat, Speaker Boehner has voted no on all but one bill
aimed to raise the minimum wage since 1996.102 The Speaker’s voting
history likely reduces the likelihood of his caving and allowing a vote on
the minimum wage this year. 103
For that reason, President Obama is taking a different tact to try to
raise the minimum wage: he is appealing to Democratic governors to

99

Vanessa Wong, This is What Would Happen If Fast-Food Workers Got Raises,
Bloomberg BusinessWeek (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201308-02/this-is-what-would-happen-if-fast-food-workers-got-raises.
100
See Part I.
101
Fred Barnes, Maximum Meltdown, 1 THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Apr. 29, 1996),
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Protected/Articles/000/000/007
/621qdhht.asp?page=2.
102
JOHN
A.
BOEHNER’S
POLITICAL
SUMMARY,
available
at
http://votesmart.org/candidate/27015/john-boehner?categoryId=3&type=V#.
VD8LHildXOY. Four months after the interview in which Speaker Boehner issued his
threat, President Clinton signed a minimum wage hike into law that lifted the wage by
ninety cents. When Democrats took over the House in 2007, Boehner again voted against
raising the minimum wage. The only instance in which Boehner voted in support of a
minimum wage hike was in 2006, when he strategically voted with the hope that passing
an increase in the minimum wage would preclude Democrats from being able to
campaign with the intent of taking over the House. Molly K. Hooper & Bob Cusack,
Boehner: Suicide Over Minimum Wage Hike, THE HILL (Feb. 21, 2014), http://thehill.
com/homenews/house/198856-boehner-id-rather-kill-myself-than-raise-the-minimumwage.
103
Hooper, supra note 102. There has been some suggestion that Boehner might be
forced to cave as a result of political pressure, as happened in 2006 when the Democrats
last threatened to take over the House of Representatives.
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support his initiative at the state level.104 Four governors in particular–
Dannel Malloy of Connecticut, Deval Patrick of Massachusetts, Peter
Shumlin of Vermont, and Lincoln Chafee of Nebraska–have joined the
President in pushing for a higher minimum wage, and six states 105 have
enacted higher minimum wages since Obama’s 2013 State of the Union
address. 106
The Democrats’ push finds support in reports that an increase in
minimum wage would likely augment consumer spending, 107 which has
been a chief concern of the Federal Reserve during the economic
recovery. 108 Such a raise would most benefit the Democrats’ base given
that
a raise would help lower-income earners contend with a
decrease in government assistance such as the foodstamp program and the increase in the payroll tax that
have hurt household purchases, which account for over
70 percent of the economy. 109
As a result of an increased borrowing power from a higher wage
earnings, “a $1 increase in minimum pay leads to $250 in extra income
per quarter for households with adult minimum-wage earners, spurring
$700 in quarterly spending in the year following the escalation.”110

104

Dave Boyer, New England Governors, Obama to Push Minimum Wage,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 2, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obamapush-minimum-wage-wednesday-governors-conference-article-1.1708078.
105
These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island. Labor Code, CAL. STAT., § 1182.12 (2013); CONN. STAT., § 31-58 (2014);
DEL. STAT. tit. 19, § 902(a) (2014); N.Y. STAT., § 652 (2014); N.J. STAT., § 12:56-3.1
(2013); R.I. STAT., § 28-12-3 (2014).
106
Obama to Push Minimum Wage Increase Wednesday at Governors’ Conference,
New York Daily News, Mar. 2, 2014, 1:20 PM, http://nydn.us/1eR0aO7.
107
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014).
108
LaVaughn Henry, Consumer Spending Reflects New Priorities after the Recession,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND ECONOMIC TRENDS, Feb. 5, 2014, at 7, 7-9.
109
Jeanna Smialek, Minimum Wage Increase in U.S. Will Probably Promote Spending,
BLOOMBERG PERSONAL FIN. (Feb. 27, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2014-02-27/minimum-wage-increase-in-u-s-will-probably-promote-spending.html
(citing DANIEL AARONSON & ERIC FRENCH, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO,
HOW DOES A FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE HIKE AFFECT AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD SPENDING?
(2013)).
110
Id. (citing AARONSON, supra note 109, at 3) (“real spending in households with adult
minimum wage workers rises, on average, by approximately $700 per quarter during the
first few quarters following a $1 hike in the hourly minimum wage. This additional
spending, which exceeds the immediate income gain of $250 per quarter, is primarily on
durable goods, particularly new vehicles (financed with credit)”).
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The fact that the presented social science data is conflicting should
not have any bearing on the ultimate issue of constitutionality of a
minimum wage hike; rather, any dispute in data merely points to whether
such an intervention would be good or bad public policy to combat
poverty. There exist additional justifications for raising the minimum
wage, and, this Comment argues, chief among them is regulating the
negative externalities produced by industries.

IV.

ANALYZING THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WIDESPREAD
INDUSTRY EXTERNALITIES

The federal government is no stranger to regulating industries in
order to protect the public from paying the costs generated by negative
externalities. In its landmark decision upholding the constitutionality of
the Affordable Care Act, the Supreme Court held that an Act of Congress
that mandates the purchase of a particular product—health insurance—is
not constitutional under the Commerce Clause, 111 but that the levying of
a tax on individuals who did not purchase healthcare insurance is
constitutional under the government’s Tax Power. 112 While the fact
pattern between the argument for healthcare insurance and a higher
minimum wage is largely similar–a big part of the reason for the
healthcare legislation was to account for the large share of taxpayer
dollars that went towards uncompensated care covered by Medicaid, 113
which is simply a narrower version of using taxpayer dollars covering a
broader array of expenses with public assistance money–this Comment
contends that it would be inefficient to resolve the public assistance gap
through a tax on employers.
Whereas the question of whom and how to tax for healthcare
purposes is simple–does an individual have healthcare insurance and, if
given a negative answer, including a tax on the individual–the same
question in a minimum wage context offers the unpleasant remedy of
taxing businesses per minimum wage employee. Aside from being
political suicide, such a tax connotes a punishment for hiring someone at
the minimum legally sanctioned going-rate. It is important to note that
using a tax rationale similar to that of the Affordable Care Act for the
purposes of justifying a higher minimum wage amounts to nothing more
111

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012).
Id. at 2600.
113
JANUARY ANGELES, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOW HEALTH
REFORM’S MEDICAID EXPANSION WILL IMPACT STATE BUDGETS: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WILL PICK UP NEARLY ALL COSTS, EVEN AS EXPANSION PROVIDES COVERAGE TO
MILLIONS OF LOW-INCOME UNINSURED AMERICANS 1 (2012).
112
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than a mental exercise, given that Darby Lumber held the minimum
wage to be within the constraints of the Commerce Clause.
The appropriate government regulation, therefore, is mandating a
higher minimum wage. There are two strong precedents for action to
regulate an actor’s behavior through mandated action. The first pertains
to environmental regulations on factories that, in their current form, serve
to protect the public health and, in proposed forms, quantify the external
costs of production and charge the factories that rate. The second pertains
to regulations on motorcycles that are structured to reduce the taxpayer’s
burden of paying for injuries to helmetless riders who get into accidents
and endure severe head trauma.

A.

Environmental Regulations

Environmental regulations are the classic example of a negative
externality. Take, for example, a consumer’s purchase of power from the
electric grid:
When I buy power from my electric company, a
generator somewhere in Victoria’s Latrobe valley works
a little bit harder and makes some extra greenhouse
gases. I pay for the electricity and that money
compensates the electricity retailer, distributor,
transmission company and the generator. But people
who are adversely affected by the pollution receive no
compensation. They suffer a ‘negative externality.’ 114
The United States regulates against environmental harms at the national,
state, and local levels.115
Congress derives its authority to regulate the environment from the
Commerce Clause.116 However, “[w]hich school of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence controls a challenge to federal environmental law is
critically important”117 as there are two theories: (a) Raich, under which
the Court held that Congress had to apply a rational basis test to conclude
whether the aggregate effects of the regulation affected interstate
114

Stephen King, Global Warming, Externalities and Government Failures, ECON.
STUDENT SOC’Y OF AUSTL (June 24, 2013), http://economicstudents.com/2013/06/globalwarming-externalities-and-government-failure/.
115
E.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency; Florida Environmental
Regulations Commission; Miami-Dade County Environmental Ordinances.
116
James R. May, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Environmental
Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LAW AND STRATEGY 359, 370 (Cary R.
Perlman ed., 2009).
117
Id. at 372.
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commerce 118; and (b) Lopez, which limits congressional regulation to
certain types of activity, 119 and Morrison, which establishes guidelines
for Congress to follow in conducting such regulation. 120 Raich is
considered the easier theory under which a negative externality may be
regulated. 121
For nearly the same reasons as have been established to allow
Congress to regulate the environment, government may act to regulate
the wage market under the authority of the Commerce Clause. The
guidelines under Raich and Lopez are satisfied by the same factors under
which Darby Lumber was legitimized, and the wealth of information that
has been collected about minimum wage would certainly satisfy the
Morrison guidelines for control. Still, the remedies offered by issues that
arise in environmental regulation—which are mainly punitive in
nature 122—fail to satisfy the craving for a more preemptive solution to
justify a minimum wage hike under the Commerce Clause.

B.

Motorcycle Regulations

While of a slightly different nature, motorcycle helmet laws seem to
satisfy this craving. While there is no federally established motorcycle
helmet mandate, only three states in the country have not passed at least
a partial helmet law.123 On their face, motorcycle helmet laws are
incredibly similar to minimum wage laws in that they both force an actor

118

Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); see also May, supra note 116, at 371
(“the majority in [Gonzalez v.] Raich simply asked whether Congress had a ‘rational
basis’ for concluding that the ‘aggregate effects’ of those regulated activities collectively
significantly affect interstate commerce”).
119
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995); see also May, supra note 116, at 370 (“In
United States v. Lopez (involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act), the Court explained
that the Commerce Clause only allows Congress to regulate (i) channels of, (ii)
instrumentalities of, and (iii) activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce”).
120
U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-618 (2000); see also May, supra note 116, at
370-371 (“In United States v. Morrison, (involving the Violence Against Women Act),
the Court elaborated on the third of these, explaining that activities that ‘substantially
affect’ interstate commerce are those in which (1) the underlying activity is ‘inherently
economic,’ (2) Congress has made specific findings about the regulated activity’s effect
on interstate commerce, (3) the law contains a jurisdictional element establishing that the
cause of action is pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and (4) the overall
effects of the activity actually are substantial”).
121
May, supra note 116, at 372.
122
See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and
Reputation Costs 7 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 71, 1999).
123
The three states without such laws are Illinois, Iowa, and New Hampshire. CDC,
Save Lives, Save Money – How Does Your State Measure Up?, http://www.cdc.gov
/Motorvehiclesafety/mc/states/index.html?s_cid=fb_tbi529 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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to act preemptively by imposing costs on an actor to protect a societal
interest. 124
Motorcycle helmet laws have been ruled constitutional by the highest
courts in more than twenty-five states as a means to protect society from
incurring the costs borne to society by helmetless riders who consume
taxpayer dollars after an accident. The Supreme Court held this
reasoning to be sound in Simon v. Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts:
From the moment of the injury, society picks the person
up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital
and municipal doctors; provides him with
unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he
cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes
permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for
his and his family’s continued subsistence. We do not
understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think
that only he himself is concerned. 125
In affirming the helmet law, the Simon Court specifically cites the
various costs to society that show the impact of a decision to not wear a
helmet extends beyond the individual.
Similarly, the public assistance costs to society, arising out of an
employment contract that engages an individual in a traditional
workweek for less than is necessary to sustain a family of three, extend
beyond the parties to that contract. To use the framework of the Simon
analysis, from the moment of the contract, society assists the individual
and his dependents with the funds necessary to make up the public
assistance gap; protects his family during times of unemployment as
minimum wage earners generally lack savings 126; provide him with the
potential of vocational training, if he qualifies; and, if he gets sick, pays
for his healthcare with Medicaid. The reasoning in motorcycle helmet
laws is parallel to that which may be put forth to lend credence to
minimum wage as a regulatory tool.

C.

Minimum Wage As a Regulatory Tool

The minimum wage has long been thought of more of a
redistributional tool than anything else. Economists have noted that
124

See Common Myths About Motorcycle Helmets and Motorcycle Helmet Laws,
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/pedbimot
/motorcycle/safebike/myths.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
125
Id. (quoting Simon v. Sargent, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)).
126
See Johnson, supra note 4.
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“[t]he goal of a minimum wage is not, of course, to reduce employment,
but to redistribute earnings to low-paid workers.” 127 While Barack
Obama gave a 2001 interview that suggested that the judicial system
might be the best medium through which an economic redistribution
could transpire, 128 the courts have not ruled on this Robin Hood
theory. 129 More than likely, any potential assessment of minimum wage
legislation will be borne out of its potential as a regulatory tool and
handled as such.
The reasoning behind motorcycle helmet laws is parallel to that
which may be put forth to lend credence to minimum wage as a
regulatory tool; after all, what is the minimum standard-of-living wage if
not a helmet to protect workers from poverty? Defining minimum wage
as a regulatory tool is important to its constitutionality because, having
once been established as a means against workplace gender and age
discrimination and later affirmed as a matter of interstate commerce, the
initial reasons for establishing the floor are not necessarily sufficient to
protect against an argument that raising the minimum wage constitutes
overregulation. Having established that the minimum wage is
functionally equivalent of a wage market motorcycle helmet law, this
Comment deems its status as a regulatory tool is sufficient to protect the
constitutionality of an increase.

V.

REMEDYING THE TAXPAYERS’ SUPERSIZED BURDEN

The reality of raising the minimum wage is that the floor is
legislatively set, and there is a partisan impasse in Congress that has
precluded deserving legislation from reaching the White House for
approval. Without legislative passage, there can be no true remedy to
remedy the taxpayers’ supersized burden.

127
Richard B. Freeman, The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool, 106 THE ECON. J.
639, 639 (1996).
128
Audio Tape: Interview with Barack Obama, WBEZ CHI. 91.5 FM (2001), available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkpdNtTgQNM#t=11.
129
The Robin Hood theory concerns the notion of redistributing wealth from the rich to
the poor; alas, such redistribution here is not orchestrated by arrow-wielding outcasts clad
in tights, but instead by the courts. In Edgewood v. Kirby, the Supreme Court of Texas
did adjudicate a dispute of the Robin Hood theory in which education money was
collected by counties and redistributed to the school districts, declaring that the system
was unconstitutional where funds were funneled from wealthier to poorer school districts.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). When that court held
Robin Hood redistribution to be an unconstitutional method of raising and allocating
education money, the legislature sought to enact an amendment to the state constitution to
ratify the plan. Kathy J. Hayes & Daniel J. Slottje, RETHINKING ROBIN HOOD (1993).
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This Comment contends that the President does, however, have soft
power tools at his disposal to effectuate a higher minimum wage, or to
put pressure on Congress to actualize that result. For example, the
President may urge a blue-ribbon study on poverty to determine whether
the poverty thresholds and guidelines are accurate, or whether they need
to be updated. That study, which would be completed after the Obama
administration has been term-limited, would almost certainly reflect the
conclusions reached in Part I of this Comment: the poverty threshold is
an outdated metric based on an anachronistic calculation.
The result of such a study would be a reconfiguration of the
terminology that would house more people under a “poverty”
designation, without burdening this President or the next with the
politically damaging brand of “causing” a higher poverty rate. This
reclassification would also serve to allow families that are wrongly
considered above the poverty line to qualify for needed aid under a more
encompassing poverty guidelines.
More traditional means are also available for the President to enact
change on minimum wage legislation. One such example would be
taking advantage of the Presidential bully pulpit to showcase a
personable Chief Executive who wowed people with his eloquence and
feel for the needs of the middle class during his two campaign cycles.
The President may prioritize a higher minimum wage in speeches such as
his State of the Union address and when campaigning around the country
for Democratic candidates for the House and Senate during the 2014
election cycle. Placing populist pressure on Republican candidates may
serve to shift their campaign rhetoric towards the President on this issue
or perhaps result in the election of Democratic candidate to traditionally
Republican seats.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The minimum wage must be raised to mitigate the societal costs of
public assistance due to insufficient hourly pay to low-income workers.
As minimum wage is sufficiently similar to a motorcycle helmet law that
preemptively imposes a cost on an actor to protect a societal interest, it
follows that the minimum wage may function as an effective regulatory
tool against corporations that are inclined to externalize their business
costs as a burden of the general public.
Given that Congress seems unwilling, or unable, to pass legislation
at the moment, the President may act on his authority as the Chief
Executive to use soft law as a means to protect workers from employers’
relatively strength in determining the wage market. Ultimately, the
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minimum wage must be raised as part of an overall strategy to combat
poverty. That increase will be held constitutional in this nation’s highest
court.

